

14 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Staff Meeting Minutes of 14 March 1979

The Director chaired the meeting. []

25X1

The Director noted that he and Mr. Carlucci were among those who met the President last evening on his return from the Middle East. []

25X1

Noting the tenuousness of the situation in Afghanistan, Lehman said that 500 people have been arrested in the aftermath of the 12 March aborted coup. This considerably narrows Taraki's political base. He added that the head of another antigovernment faction based in Pakistan has declared a holy war but no incidents have occurred as yet. He advised that the Afghan army could disintegrate under these conditions. []

25X1

McMahon advised that Libya is conducting a large military exercise, which Qadhafi is personally overseeing, near the Egyptian border. Egypt has postponed its planned invasion of Libya from June to September. []

25X1

25X1

Taylor repeated his previous remarks about OMB's intentions to write David Aaron asking him to bring the question of a reserve release for released [] to the SCC. Aaron intends to respond with a refusal. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

Hetu advised that US News & World Report is planning a major indepth story on intelligence, and CIA in particular, and has requested to interview the DCI, DDCI, and McMahon. They hope to finish the article by the end of next week. In response to Mr. Carlucci's question, Hetu suggested that the interviews be granted if possible. He mentioned that he told US News & World Report about the Agency's dissatisfaction with the misleading way that Newsweek handled its interview with the Director. US News & World Report assured him that the Agency would be able to review answers to any questions to ensure they had been handled properly. []

25X1

Hetu called attention to the disturbing article by Richard Burt on the USSR missiles in today's New York Times (attached). He said that when he refused to provide a comment on the story to Burt last night, Burt said it didn't matter because he had already spoken to a "CIA aide." []

25X1

[] The Director suggested that the story could have come from the SALT meeting that he attended a week ago Monday. []

25X1

25X1

The Director told Hicks that he spoke to D/DIA Tighe about the NFAC paper regarding the number of Cubans involved in the Yemeni dispute. He said that Tighe was concerned that the character of the Yemeni war could change markedly if the Cubans became more involved. He hoped that we could narrow the differences between the [] estimates of the number of Cubans and Soviets taking part in the hostilities. [] mentioned that Senator Baker had a large figure regarding the number of Cubans involved and asked us to check on the matter. The Director mentioned that the 2,500-3,000 figure that Baker cited reflected the [] estimates. []

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SECRET

Hicks noted receipt of a copy of the Stoertz memo responding to General Jones' comments about intelligence participation in net assessment. Hicks said that in addition to his concern about having the necessary personnel, he thought that NFAC needed to have some influence over how the JCS exercises would be designed. The Director said that his intention in this exercise was to obtain more cooperation between JCS and CIA in the production of NIE 11-3/8. []

25X1

25X1

[] urged the Director to take the initiative on the Burt story in his briefing this afternoon with the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee and our other subcommittees. The Director asked that NFAC prepare something for this purpose. (Action: NFAC) []

25X1

25X1

[] advised that the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing on SALT verification went well. The one question asked repeatedly was whether or not the CIA budget was adequate for verification. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

[] reported that NSA has drafted an Executive Service bill to get the benefits for its personnel of the Civil Service Reform Act. It includes provisions for early retirement and sabbaticals. Miller said he would circulate a memo on the main points. []

25X1

25X1

Briggs reported that new IOB staffer Kujovich has asked for briefings and will begin tomorrow with John Stein. []

25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

[REDACTED]

The Director said that he felt uneasy that we have not been reporting on the Iranian military for some time. McMahon suggested that a large percentage of them were AWOL. The Director said that Waller's memo reflected a possibility of a military counter coup. Hicks said that he would check and advise. (Action: NFAC) [REDACTED]

25X1

Hetu reminded McMahon that the Counter Spy press conference at the UN was scheduled for today. Later in the meeting Lapham asked if any Agency representatives planned to attend the conference, suggesting that someone should. In response to the Director's question, McMahon said that he preferred not to have [REDACTED] representative attend because it could be perceived as an act of physical surveillance. Mr. Carlucci concurred that Counter Spy could exploit such an action to their advantage. Lapham said that it would be difficult to register a complaint about the announcements if we did not hear firsthand what they had to say. After a brief discussion, the Director suggested that [REDACTED] work out an arrangement for obtaining information released at the press conference. (Action: DDO and NFAC)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reported that he has just returned from a 10-day trip to Europe, where he had useful discussions with EUCOM on ways to enhance our intelligence support to them. He noted that EUCOM's experiment using computers to call and determine what is available in intelligence appears to be a useful step in the right direction.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

SECRET

[] said that NSC staffer Rosenberg is continuing to probe his staff on possible alternatives to [] in response to pressure from David Aaron. The Director said that he does not intend to go beyond what he has already discussed with Aaron and the SCC on this topic. []

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25X1

[] reported that he just completed an excellent trip to the Far East, where he felt people were satisfied with their intelligence support.

25X1

25X1

The Director said that he would like to meet at 1315 hours this afternoon for about a half hour with appropriate NFAC analysts to discuss possible reactions on the part of the Arabs, Chinese, Soviets, and others to the Middle East settlement. []

25X1

25X1

Evans introduced [] who is joining his staff. []

25X1

Hetu reported that [] officer arrested by DEA (see Morning Minutes of 7 March) was released yesterday because of a case of mistaken identity. Lapham said that his staff did the work showing that this individual could not have been involved in what he was charged with. Hetu said that off the record he told a press reporter that this individual was under cover. []

25X1

25X1

SECRET

Soviet Reported To Add to Load Missile Can Fire

By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 13—American arms negotiators have been shaken by intelligence information indicating that the Soviet Union's most powerful missile is being adapted to carry more warheads than would be permitted under the projected arms-limitation treaty.

The information has led to charges by some defense officials that the Central Intelligence Agency was slow in informing other agencies about the development.

Government officials said today that the Russians had tested the missile, the SS-18, shortly after Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance met with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in Geneva last December.

Test Flight Monitored by C.I.A.

Although the Soviet Union had agreed that the projected accord would limit the number of warheads on the missile to 10, the results of the test were said to have led intelligence aides to conclude that the missile was being given the capability of carrying up to 14 warheads.

Officials said the C.I.A. had monitored the SS-18 during its test flight. While the missile did not release more than 10 warheads, officials said, the test indicated that it could do so.

Several officials compared the incident to another SS-18 test, shortly before the Vance-Gromyko meeting, in which performance data radioed by the missile was in code. The United States has complained about this practice, and the Soviet Union's concealment of test information has emerged as the last important technical problem blocking an arms accord.

Some officials said the apparent modernization of the SS-18 could also pose an obstacle to an early arms pact.

Government officials, in promoting the accord on Capitol Hill, have stressed the provision freezing the number of war-

Continued on Page A7, Column 1

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1979

Soviet Data on Improved Missile Shakes U.S. Aides

Continued From Page A1

heads as one of the most important accomplishments. By limiting the number of missile warheads that could be deployed by the Russians, the officials say, the agreement would serve to neutralize the Soviet advantage in the overall weight that the missiles of the two sides are able to deliver.

Some officials said that, to be sure the Russians cannot increase the warhead capacity of their existing missile force, it may now be necessary to negotiate a stricter provision on missile modernization.

If the United States adopted such a course, it could lead to another delay in completing the talks, these officials said.

Others said the C.I.A. and other agencies were still studying the SS-18 test data and no decision had been taken on whether to confront the Russians with the information.

An official involved in the arms talks said that while intelligence data suggested that the SS-18 could carry more than 10 warheads, there was no conclusive proof that the Soviet Union planned to put more warheads atop the missile during the period to be covered by the projected treaty. He suggested that the

Russians might use the additional capacity for decoys, or dummy warheads, a capability that the United States also possesses.

The fact that the Russians have demonstrated a capability to deploy more than 10 warheads on the SS-18 may raise doubts in the minds of arms control critics over whether the Soviet Union intends to adhere to the provision limiting warhead numbers.

The limit of 10 warheads had been chosen in the negotiations because it was the maximum number previously observed aboard the missile. Only through the monitoring of Soviet tests will the

United States be able to verify that the Russians are complying with the warhead limit in the projected arms treaty.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon has been asking why the C.I.A. took two months to inform other agencies of the results of the missile test. According to Defense Department aides, William R. Perry, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, was not informed until last week and was said to be angry.

Congressional aides said members of Congress were also concerned about the C.I.A.'s delay. Representative Robin L. Beard, a Tennessee Republican who is on the House Armed Services Committee, said he was planning to ask the panel to investigate whether the agency he had "bottled up" the information.

A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment, but an agency official said pri-

vately that the analysis of the test data had taken several weeks of concentrated work and there had been no effort to delay dissemination.